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Introduction 
 
EU leaders are currently facing a widespread refugee crisis. In order to address the 
crisis as a common European challenge, individual member states need to take their 
responsibilities for refugees and fellow member states. While politicians on both the 
European and national level are looking for concrete steps and solutions, resistance 
against the reception of refugees has been growing increasingly. Anti-immigration 
protest groups as Pegida in Germany are literally on the march spreading a message 
that includes calling a halt to immigration from non-Western states into the EU. 
Supporters of Pegida call themselves patriots against the ‘Islamisation’ of the West. In 
order to get a better understanding of the movement, this study will give a close 
examination of Pegida, the refugee crisis and the EU in relation with the German 
media.  Furthermore, the position of these media towards the Dresden-based media 
will be scrutinised and investigated to what extent the former affects the latter.
 Looking at the structure, the thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 
will set out the story behind Pegida, what the movement precisely stands for in terms 
of its complaints against non-Western immigrants, who the figureheads are, why it 
organises its Monday night marches, and where the turnout is largest. As Pegida 
promptly emerged as a movement led by citizens, this chapter also explains the 
different concepts of social movements and seeks to classify Pegida in order to 
identify the movement rationales. Since the refugee crisis has already exposed that 
national governments are incapable of resolving the issue of refugees alone, EU 
member states need to collaborate to preclude the crisis from getting worse. The EU 
has been heavily criticized for either doing too little or for being powerless to rightly 
address the inflow of refugees attempting to reach Europe.     
 Chapter 2 therefore explores the locus of Pegida in relation with the refugee 
crisis and the EU. Firstly, the chapter will delve into the current situation against the 
backdrop of the refugee crisis and how the EU attempts to take control over the 
present problems. The concept and definition of Euroscepticism will then be touched 
upon as well as an essential part of the academic debate on Euroscepticism. 
Subsequently, it will be assessed to what extent Pegida is a Eurosceptic movement, 
mapping out the areas which Pegida particularly focuses on. 
 Zooming in on the implications of Pegida’s quick rise, chapter 3 will introduce 
an online content analysis examining to what extent the image of the Dresden-based 
	 4 
movement is shaped or affected – either positively or negatively - by Bild and the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SDZ). By choosing these two newspapers, this chapter keeps an 
important facet in mind. Bild and SDZ are respectively the largest national boulevard 
newspaper and the biggest subscription daily newspaper in Germany. Clearly, this 
will not fully cover all of the readers in Germany, but it provides an appropriate 
representation of German readerships in the framework of this research. By selecting 
and scrutinising online news articles, an online media content analysis will be 
conducted in which the use of language regarding the articles’ content, headlines and 
(sub) headings will be singled out and analysed. Accordingly, employing such an 
online content analysis would be the most effective means to investigate the position 
of Pegida within two of the most influential German media.    
 Finally, the thesis concludes by answering the following research question: 
How can Pegida’s evolvement be explained best and to what extent have Bild and 
SDZ contributed to or hampered the rise of the movement? 
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1. The emergence of Pegida as a protest movement  
 
1.1. The rapid rise of a Dresden-born initiative 
 
It is 10 October 2014 when Lutz Bachmann wanders through the streets of the city of 
Dresden when he comes across a pro-PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) demonstration. 
The woman who holds the microphone on the stage spreads a message including that 
the Kurds need be given weapons in order to defend themselves against Islamist 
terrorists.1 The PKK– outlawed in Germany since 1993 - wanted to show solidarity 
with the citizens of Kobani, a city in Syria then recently bombed by the Islamic State 
(IS). Bachmann films the event with his mobile phone. As Bachmann later recalled, 
the demonstration inspired him, and the fundament of a protest movement was laid 
that night. At the same time, he was not at all supportive of the Kurdish cause being a 
fierce opponent of political rallies of outlawed foreign organisations. In his view, 
these demonstrations pointed out the danger of ‘religious wars’ on German streets. In 
other words, Germany should not get involved in ‘non-German’ or ‘Islamic’ conflicts. 
This notion would initially become one of the spear points of Pegida.2 On that very 
same day, Bachmann, a butcher’s son from Dresden and several times convicted for - 
among other things - burglary, posted the video on YouTube.3 One day later he 
created the Facebook group called ‘Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes’ (Peaceful Europeans against the Islamisation of the West), which soon 
turned into Pegida. In very little time, the Facebook group changed into a popular 
meeting point. Ordinary people got in touch with nationalists linked to motorcycle 
clans and the notoriously right-wing fan groups of football club Dynamo Dresden.4 
Also, the organisational structure began to take form rapidly. Alongside Bachmann as 
the face of the ‘Orga Team', Pegida soon encompassed twelve members, of which 
Kathrin Oertel, the only female member of Pegida who – as an exception – publicly 																																																								
1 Wolf, Ulrich, Schneider, Alexander, Wolf, Tobias. 2014. "Pegida - wie alles begann." Medium 
Magazin für Journalisten (2): pp.16. 
2 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.524. 
3 Hauser, Uli. Wutbürger, die nicht reden wollen. Stern, 15 December 2014 [last accessed 7 January 
2016. Available from http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/die-koepfe-hinter-pegida--wutbuerger--
die-nicht-reden-wollen-3472688.html. 
4 Maximilian Popp, Andreas Wassermann. Prying into Pegida: Where Did Germany's Islamophobes 
Come From? Spiegel 12 January 2015 [last accessed 1 April 2015. Available from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/origins-of-german-anti-muslim-group-pegida-a-
1012522.html 1012522.html. pp.2. 
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appeared in the Günther Jauch talk show on the national German television Das Erste, 
‘Hausmeister’ (caretaker) and vice chef Rene Jahn and ‘Pegida-Planer’ (scheduler) 
Frank Ingo Friedemann, were the most important figures.5 
The first rally took place on 16 October 2014, a Monday night, in the form of 
a ‘Spaziergang’ (walk) through the streets of Dresden, the capital of Sachsen. By 
chanting ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (we are the people) and choosing the Monday night to 
protest, Pegida hijacked the slogan of the 1989 protestors and placed itself into the 
tradition of the insurgence prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in East Germany.6 
Whereas only 350 people had come to the events by the end of October, Pegida 
attracted increasingly more people over the following weeks, not only in the centre of 
Dresden, but also in other places in Germany. Regional counterparts instantly popped 
up across the country, such as Bagida (Bayern), Bogida (Bonn), Bärgida (Berlin), 
Dügida (Düsseldorf), Pegida Frankfurt Rhein-Main, Legida (Leipzig), and Mügida 
(München). However, no other sister movement was able to equate the number of 
protestors that turned up in Dresden at its height. Shortly before Christmas, on 22 
December 2014, approximately 17.500 people took part in the protest march in 
Dresden.7 In the aftermath of the Islamist terrorist attacks on the satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the number of protestors mid-January even exceeded those 
numbers when Pegida attracted as many as 25.000 demonstrators at their marches. In 
response to the growing popularity of Pegida, counter-protests quickly emerged as 
well. Promoting the German ‘Willkommenskultur’ (Welcoming culture) and tolerance 
towards foreigners, NoPegida was one of these initiatives that outnumbered Pegida 
everywhere except in Dresden.8 Criticisms of Pegida in the media soon followed as 
well. German newspapers as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on an 
online petition signed by more than 170.000 people against Pegida.9 Also Bild 
published an article stating that eighty prominent Germans ranging from prominent 																																																								
5 Machowecz, Martin. Busen, Bier und Islamismus. Zeit, 23 April 2015. 
6 Weiß, Volker. Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. 
Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-
pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " Journal for 
Deradicalization pp.179. 
9 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 170.000 Unterschriften gegen islamfeindliche Bewegung. 28 
December 2014 [last accessed 25 November 2015. Available from 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/pegida-170-000-unterschriften-gegen-islamfeindliche-bewegung-
13343927.html. 
	 7 
politicians to famous actors and artists expressed their concern about the rise of 
Pegida and its alleged xenophobia and intolerance towards Muslims in Germany and 
refugees in general.10 There was no doubt that Pegida opposed the arrival of Muslim 
refugees in Germany, but the underlying message remained rather vague. Supporters 
of Pegida, i.e. the people who took to the streets and raised their voice in the Monday 
night rallies, were only connected through a ‘fear’ of ‘Islamisation’ and Muslims 
infiltrating German society leading to a subsequent ‘loss’ of German culture and 
identity. Accordingly, the call for a movement programme became louder. Prior to the 
rally on 15 December 2014, Pegida published a movement paper of nineteen bulleted 
position statements on one page. The position paper included, inter alia, Germany’s 
duty to take in war refugees and to give them asylum (‘Das ist Menschenpflicht!’ – 
That is a human duty!; point one), but the number of asylum seekers to Germany 
should be controlled based on a points system in line with Canadian and Swiss 
models (point six). It also put forward the preservation and protection of the 
Christian-Jewish ‘Abendland’ (the Occident or Western civilisation; point thirteen).11  
As a result of the quick rise of Pegida and the many criticisms it provoked, 
various scholars began to scrutinise Pegida critically. Volker Weiß, a historian 
specialised in anti-Semitism and right-wing extremism in Germany, argued that 
Pegida’s position paper depicted mostly positive formulations (i.e. in favour of 
refugees) regarding the acceptance of refugees calling for better integration measures 
and suggesting to apply the classic law-and-order strategy to themes such as the 
expulsion of asylum seekers and criminal refugees (point nine).12 At the same time, it 
stood for progressive topics such as sexual self-determination (point twelve), which is 
traditionally strongly disapproved of within conservative and extreme-right wing 
circles. According to Weiß, Pegida therefore succeeded to create a position covering a 
wide range of subjects, which cannot only be associated with extreme right parties as 
the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). 13  However, with criticism 
mounting, the resistance against the Dresden-based movement grew as well. Whereas 																																																								
10 Bild. Nein zu Pegida! 6 January 2015 [last accessed 25 November 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/pegida/promis-sagen-nein-zu-pegida-39208948.bild.html. 
11 PEGIDA."Pegida Positionspapier" 2014. [last accessed 20 December 2015. Available from 
http://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Weiß, Volker. Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. 
Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-
pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes. 
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most German journalists and many scholars strongly condemned Pegida immediately, 
German politicians initially were more cautious in choosing their position. However, 
by the end of the year, Angela Merkel joined in the discussion about Pegida as well, 
sharing the abhorrence of the ‘hate marches’ in her New Year’s speech.14   
  
Together with the statements pointed out in the position paper, an oft-heard complaint 
of Pegida is that the elite have long forgotten about the ‘ordinary’ man as the 
‘political elitist’ turn up in talk shows to only ‘blather’ about nothing but their own 
topics. Bachmann often adopts the rhetoric insisting that the political establishment 
has betrayed its voters by not paying attention to the concerns of the German citizen.15 
In response to the claim, Dietmar Hüser, Professor at Saarland University, draws the 
comparison with the Poujadist movement, a protest group in France at the time of the 
political crisis of the Fourth Republic in the 1950s, in which Pierre Poujade invoked a 
‘populist’ rhetoric denouncing the critical state-citizen relationship in the hopes of 
winning the people’s heart. One of the chief strategies copied by Pegida is the 
argument of implying to be non-political and hence standing by the ordinary people. 
According to Hüser, this is one of the reasons Pegida can be seen as a populist 
movement.16 In addition, the contradiction of elite vs. the ordinary man could create a 
sense of solidarity, even strengthening the ‘romantic’ feeling of regional identity in 
times of globalisation. This exclusiveness was also reflected in the fact that Pegida 
refused to speak to the press - even though this media boycott was later largely 
abandoned.17 As part of the obstinate anti-media campaign, Pegida put German media 
aside as ‘Lüggenpresse’ (lying press). The reason was simple: the media lied to the 
public and could therefore not be trusted. In line with this argument, Pegida suggested 
that people often feel misunderstood by what newspapers write and should 
																																																								
14 Spiegel. Neujahrsansprache der Kanzlerin: Merkel prangert Hass bei Pegida-Märschen an. 31 
December 2014 [last accessed 28 November 2015. Available from 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-kritisiert-pegida-bei-neujahrsansprache-scharf-a-
1010785.html#. 
15 Weiß, Volker. Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. 
Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-
pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes.  
16 Maja Henke, Edward Lloyd 2015. "Protest und Populismus – eine schwierige Abgrenzung in Zeiten 
pegida von AfD und Pegida. Ein Bericht über die Tagung „Protestkultur – Populismus?“ 2014 in der 
Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing." Außen Sicherheitspolit pp.289. 
17 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.525. 
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accordingly take a cautious stance towards the press.18 That is why Bachmann and his 
companions usually did not give interviews, except for one time when Bachmann told 
Bild the ‘exclusive’ story of Pegida.19 In January 2015, it however went wrong for 
Bachmann when he was forced to step down after a photo of him as Adolf Hitler 
leaked and went viral. Making even international headlines, the publication of the 
‘Hitler-selfie’ soon fed on speculations about Bachmann’s past, as he could not refute 
the racist allegations that flew around on the internet. This affair led to a split in the 
Pegida camp between, on the one side, Bachmann supporters and Oertel and Jahn on 
the other. 20  However, his absence did not last long as Bachmann returned as 
movement leader less than four weeks later.21 Nevertheless, the Hitler-selfie was not 
without consequences. Ever since the photo was published, claims over Pegida’s 
alleged radical right-wing character had been fuelled further, especially in the German 
media. Die Zeit asked which picture Pegida would suit best. It assumed that Pegida 
supporters did not perceive of themselves as fitting in with Germany’s extreme right 
tradition, including (neo-) Nazism. Subsequently, Die Zeit rather spoke of ‘extremism 
of the centre’, coming up with an interesting explanation for Pegida’s rise. In order to 
uncover possible culprits of Pegida’s emergence, the Union of Sachsen should be 
blamed for being incapable of creating an atmosphere in which right-wing sentiments 
do not prevail. By pointing at the ultra-conservative radical-evangelical Bible belt, the 
newspaper accused local politicians of having contributed to the backwardness in 
every region of the south and the east of Sachsen.22   
Despite a series of internal scandals, Pegida meanwhile knew how to keep its 
followers captivated. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo killings in January, Pegida 
experienced a short-lived revival, but the following weeks it appealed to fewer people 
as the number of protestors steadily diminished. Nonetheless, the movement attracted 																																																								
18 Matheis, Katharina. „Wir sind alle rechts, na und?“. Handelsblatt, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 
29 November 2015. Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pegida-
demonstration-in-dresden-luegenpresse-halt-die-fresse/11121312-2.html. pp.2. 
19 Bild, Fischer, Christian. Wir hören erst auf, wenn die Asyl-Politik sich ändert! 1 December 2014 
[last accessed 1 October 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/demonstrationen/pegida-erfinder-im-interview-
38780422.bild.html. 
20 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.526. 
21 Bild. Er ist wieder da. 22 February 2015 [last accessed 10 October 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/lutz-bachmann/wieder-pedida-chef-39878132.bild.html. 
22 Lühmann, Michael. Pegida passt nach Sachsen. Zeit, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 29 
November 2015. Available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-12/pegida-dresden-
politische-tradition. 
	 10 
special political attention and praise from one party in particular: Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD). Alexander Gauland, vice-president of the party, stated that the 
Paris attacks served as the evidence for the importance of Pegida’s existence, 
declaring that traditional parties should take Pegida seriously. Gauland contended that 
the killings had exposed the vulnerability of the fundamental values, such as 
democracy, freedom of speech and press freedom.23 The rapprochement to politics 
was further enforced through an initiative of Bachmann to recruit Tatjana Festerling, a 
former AfD party member from Hamburg, to stand for the mayoral elections of 
Dresden in June 2015. However, Festerling was not able to realise the political 
ambitions of Pegida’s leader as she decided to withdraw her candidacy in the second 
round. According to Dostal, the low turnout during the elections demonstrated that 
people still felt disconnected from politics, and yet unhappy with points other than 
those raised by Pegida.24 Notwithstanding the failed political mission, Pegida did not 
lose its attraction. After a few relatively calm months, the Pegida rallies, in fact, got a 
real boost by mid-October 2015. This time the movement staged its largest 
demonstration in months. Thousands of demonstrators (between 9.000 and 12.000 
people) came together one week before the first anniversary of Pegida and declared 
their anger at the German government for taking in nearly one million refugees. 
During the rally, a few Pegida supporters held up small-scale gallows featuring two 
nooses and signs with the names of Angela Merkel and her vice-chancellor Sigmar 
Gabriel saying ‘reserved’.25 
 
1.2. Where does Pegida’s ‘Wut’ come from?   
 
As we already briefly touched upon, both in German media and through the work of 
scholars, Pegida has been described through an array of terms. Whether it be populist, 
far right, or even far right populist, Pegida appears to be difficult to label. According 
																																																								
23 Stern. AfD sieht Pegida durch Pariser Terrorakt gestärkt. 7 January 2015 [last accessed 30 
November 2015. Available from http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/afd-sieht-pegida-nach-
anschlag-auf--charlie-hebdo--gerechtfertigt-3468838.html. 
24 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.526. 
25 Handelsblatt. Radikal, radikaler, Pegida. 13 October 2015 [last accessed 1 December 2015. 
Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingskrise-radikal-radikaler-
pegida/12442380.html. 
	 11 
to Thran and Boehnke, Pegida is a “grassroot political protest movement”26, whereas 
Dostal labels it as “a right-wing populist movement” that has led to “a split between 
national liberals and national conservatives”.27 Moreover, Nachtwey argues that the 
perception of Pegida’s supporters as ‘worried citizens’ is not entirely incorrect. 
Nonetheless, they could be better seen as ‘rechte Wutbürger’ (right-wing angry 
citizens) originating from “the radicalisation of the centre”.28 Henke and Lloyd go one 
step further by arguing that the use of the term populism in relation with movements 
such as Pegida is likely to generate a more problematic standpoint, for it often 
disguises obvious racist or fascist traits within a certain group.29 One thing is for 
certain, Pegida seeks to get rid of the extremist labels. At one of the demonstrations, 
Oertel proclaimed to the media in general: “Dear press, I have to disappoint you. We 
are a right-wing movement. We love our fatherland. But contrary to the left-wing 
extremists we do not throw stones and do not insult the police whom are of great 
support to us. The police shall be complimented tonight.”30 Thus, according to the 
leaders themselves, Pegida should be seen as a right-wing nation-loving movement. 
Yet, the movement continues to demonstrate some vague inconsistencies concerning 
the content of the programme, which makes it hard to label the movement as such. 
When comparing the one-page manifesto to the topics of the speeches, it is 
remarkable to see that they do not always correspond. This ambiguity explains itself 
in the fact that visiting speakers raised new subjects that did not feature in the 
manifesto, such as the critique of an anti-Russian bias in German mainstream media 
that was expressed by one of the speakers, but cannot be found in the paper. It is 
unclear whether all of these topics have gained the equal support of Bachmann and 
his companions. According to Dostal, the creation of the position paper has been done 
																																																								
26 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.530. 
27 Dr. Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " Journal for 
Deradicalization pp.178. 
28 Nachtwey, Oliver. 2015. "Rechte Wutbürger." Blätter für deutsche und international Politik: pp.82. 
29 Maja Henke, Edward Lloyd 2015. "Protest und Populismus – eine schwierige Abgrenzung in Zeiten 
pegida von AfD und Pegida. Ein Bericht über die Tagung „Protestkultur – Populismus?“ 2014 in der 
Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing." Außen Sicherheitspolitk pp.291. 
30 Matheis, Katharina. „Wir sind alle rechts, na und?“. Handelsblatt, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 
29 November 2015. Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pegida-
demonstration-in-dresden-luegenpresse-halt-die-fresse/11121312-2.html. pp.2. 
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to appeal to mainstream conservatives as well as to avoid criticism of the movement 
as extremist.31  
           In order to further scrutinise Pegida and its origins, it is important to look at the 
relationship between culture and social movements. Both terms are closely linked and 
therefore often used to analyse each other. Kidd gave a simple definition of culture 
including “the way of life of a group of people”. He continued by arguing that it is 
“the pattern of social organisation and the ‘normal’ ways in which we are expected to 
behave in society touches upon all aspects of our daily lives”, adding one important 
side note: “Not all cultures are the same.”32 Culture is also related to another key 
word, identity. However mentioned in the previous section, it is useful to discuss it 
here in more detail. Identity relates to “how we think about ourselves as people, how 
we think about other people around us, and what we think others think of us”.33 
Though frequently linked in sociology, culture and identity should not be conceived 
as the same. While the former represents the macro pattern, i.e. the bigger picture, the 
latter is more focused on micro meanings, which are the individuals.34 The learning of 
a culture – i.e. the process whereby the traditions of a community are passed down the 
generations – that is known as socialisation, plays an important role in this analysis.35 
A combination of socialisation, culture and identity allow us to discuss how people 
behave within a social movement as Pegida. As already mentioned, the ‘Abendland 
ideology’ can be seen as one of the key pillars of the position paper. Pegida’s 
definition of the Abendland includes reference to the Judeo-Christian values that are 
regarded indispensable parts of Germany culture and identity. According to Thran and 
Boehnke, this ideology is a value-based way to construct an ‘imagined community’, 
putting it in Benedict Anderson’s classic definition of a nation.36 Seeing things 
through this paradigm, all foreigners are, in principle, considered not capable to be 
part of this community - irrespective of their intentions - since their ‘national identity’ 
does not comply with the moral order that is imagined to exist in the national 
community.37 According to Thran and Boehnke, Anderson’s ideas can be applied to 																																																								
31 Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing 
Populism Here to Stay?" The Political Quarterly pp.525. 
32 Kidd, Warren. 2002. Culture and Identity 1th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.5-6. 
33 Ibid. pp.7. 
34 Ibid. pp.7. 
35 Ibid. pp.16-17. 
36 Dr. Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " Journal for 
Deradicalization pp.192. 
37 Ibid. pp.190. 
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Pegida’s critical stance on themes such as immigration, asylum and ‘Islamisation’ 
serving as an explanation of it.38 On the other hand, one could ask why Pegida’s 
ideology thrives so much in Dresden. Prof.dr. Harmut Rosa, of the Friedrich-Schiller-
University in the east German city of Jena, addressed the question in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of why it is possible that – of all people - citizens of Dresden and 
surroundings feel like strangers in their own country with a immigrant percentage of 
below three of which 0,1 Muslim. Rosa blamed the failed adaptions of the East-
German citizens to the West-German institutions and structures after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. As a consequence, East German citizens do not feel attached to these 
‘self-created’ institutions lacking the connection to feel at home in the country they 
live. As a result, the ‘response-axis’ between mainstream politicians and large parts of 
the citizens in Dresden has broken down, as the political parties in general seem 
powerless to serve the people.39 Arguably, the lack of connection could point out why 
East-German citizens tend to trust a local newcomer Pegida rather than the existing 
mainstream parties in the region. These citizens, consequently, feel invigorated by the 
strong anti-establishment message instigating anger and disbelief towards the 
traditional political system.  
 
1.3. Digital promotion of activism  
 
For the sake of a better understanding of the functioning of Pegida, shortly 
considering the history of social movements from the second half of the twentieth 
century is needed. As the late Charles Tilly argued, history helps to explain why 
particular social movements adopted certain elements that differentiate them from 
other sorts of social movements. 40  Sociologists have seen a particular shift of 
activities and interests over the course of time. Whereas social movements in the 
1960s promoted ardent political reformism and unconventional protest objectives, Su 
H. Lee suggested that social movements - over the decades – became “more identity-
oriented and localised collective articulations of interests, issues, and needs relating 
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more directly to everyday life and values”.41 Furthermore, Su H. Lee argued that what 
had previously been non-political and non-public areas of identity, difference and 
lifestyle, all became the contentious subjects of social movements. Today grassroots 
collective protests are a widely known and visible phenomenon, whereby some of 
them remain inconspicuous and therefore less newsworthy to the public, because they 
perform at the local level with often single-issue statements. The additional features 
of such social movements are locally informal ties, loosely affiliated centres, and 
encompassing heterogeneous political demands and identities. Su H. Lee suggested 
that these autonomous groupings require relatively high levels of commitment, 
expertise, and informal networks.42 Ostensibly, these three aspects drive Pegida. 
While Pegida expects its supporters to commit to march every Monday night, visiting 
speakers need to rely on a certain degree of knowledge in order to speak to the 
audience (such as the Dutch politician Geert Wilders who held a speech in April 
201543), and Bachmann initially used his personal network to get people mobilised 
(“ninety per cent was a close circle of friends”).44 Su H. Lee defined these New Social 
Movements (NSMs) as collective protests of grassroots citizens activism including 
“citizens who translate the routines of life into extraordinary activism whereby the 
identities they constitute form the infrastructures of NSMs in practice and in 
theory”.45 Furthermore, much academic work - by among others Kolb - has been done 
on the implications of social movements in terms of its successes and failures. In 
other words, the relationship between what protestors do, in which context they do it, 
and the varying responses of the government have frequently been examined.46 In 
order to further clarify the position of Pegida regarding social movements, it makes 
sense to also examine social movement organisations (SMOs) as these organisational 
groups are usually part of social movements and aim to challenge the normal 
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democratic political process.47 The main difference between NSMs and SMOs is that 
the former focuses more on the practical notion of staging a demonstration or other 
forms of action in order to promote social change, whereas the latter is thought to 
espouse a systematic approach to coordinate the movement’s direction. 48 
Nevertheless, NSMs and SMOs are often used together within academic research. 
Since its foundation, Pegida has frequently stated that it primarily endeavours to 
change certain aspects of the political environment, with special reference to German 
policies on immigration and integration. Concerning these latter issues, Bachmann 
expressed his fear over the ‘Glaubenskriegen auf deutschem Boden’ (religious wars in 
Germany) making the repulsion of the IS fighters one of Pegida’s focal points.49 
Within the organisational framework of SMOs, a NSM is often employed as the 
mobilising strategy, which represents collective vehicles – both informally and 
formally – to engage people in collective action.50 An example of such collective 
vehicles will be given in in the next paragraph, as this closely relates to Pegida’s 
tactic.               
         Having examined SMOs and NSMs, it should be stressed that Pegida as a 
movement contains more than what they both represent. Given the various examples 
of successful digital media strategies of social movements, Pegida is certainly not a 
unique phenomenon. During the Arab Spring in 2011, digital media became the main 
tool that allowed social movements to rise up against regimes, even as these 
authoritarian governments executed counter-strategies through the same social canals 
to supress political dissent.51 Furthermore, Germany has experienced a rich history of 
activism and involvement of citizens. Perhaps needless to say, there have been some 
social movements which Germans rather not associate with. Emanating from the 
ashes of Nazism, Germany saw an upsurge in extreme right-wing and violent neo-
Nazi groups in the 1990s, especially youth under eighteen who wished to identify 																																																								
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themselves with neo-Nazi rock music calling for violence and death to foreigners. 
German intelligence believed that there were 76 neo-Nazi groups including over 
40.000 members across Germany in 1992. The Kohl administration therefore even 
adopted a legislation that included the ban of distributing neo-Nazi rock music in 
order to suppress right-wing extremism. Kohl was of the opinion that the particular 
sensitive topic of neo-Nazi revival in the form of music even transcended the debate 
on freedom of expression and therefore must to be tackled by the means of a 
prohibition.52 A more recent example of social activism in Germany is Stuttgart 21, a 
large protest movement that disputed about a new railway station in the city of 
Stuttgart in 2013.53 Yet, Pegida can be seen as a unique movement in Germany, as the 
country has never seen such an effective digital promoter of social and political 
change, even not Stuttgart 21. In the case of Pegida, the new information 
communication technologies (ICTs), including digital technology and social media, 
have been playing a significant role.54 With the onset of the digital revolution in 2004, 
Carty argued that social movement scholars and academics have shifted their attention 
to the new range of tools that activists have at their disposal.55 As Bachmann stated, 
the use of Facebook has been key for the promotion of Pegida. Without his ‘social’ 
network on Facebook, Bachmann would not have had a collective vehicle to make 
Pegida a success. 56  Via the social platform, Bachmann and his companions 
extensively communicate and disseminate information about, for instance the walks 
on Monday night, but they also share relevant news articles and documents 
concerning immigration and integration issues. A good example of Pegida’s 
mobilising strategy is the post on Facebook on 5 October 2015, which shows a short 
clip of Pegida supporters collectively chanting a German song and waving black-red-
yellow flags of Germany. The post is viewed 122k times, shared 2.325 times and 
liked by 5.050 people.57 This denotes the immense success of the use of Facebook, 
taking into consideration the ostensible ease of targeting, reaching and mobilising a 																																																								
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vast group of people, without high financial burdens. Examining Pegida’s tactical 
brain, the movement could be defined best as a merger of the NSM and SMO, having 
the extraordinary activism to promote social and political change of the former and 
the organisational structure of the latter, upon a highly efficient mobilising strategy 
through social media input.  
 
1.4. Conclusion  
 
Due to unconventional ways of promoting the controversial theme of the 
‘Islamisation’ of Germany, Pegida has been a conspicuous movement right from the 
start of its existence. Popular media and prominent figures from different 
backgrounds expressed their concern about Pegida in terms of largely condemning 
Pegida’s message of ‘prejudices of and hate towards Muslim refugees’.58 As the 
academic debate on how to define Pegida is rather diffuse, various scholars proposed 
several ways in order to label Pegida that were usually translated into terms such as 
extreme right, right-wing or populist right-wing. This is partly the effect of the 
confusion Pegida has created in terms of the different topics that were brought up at 
the marches and the written content of the manifesto. Several speakers chose to 
discuss topics, as German’s external relations with Russia, rather than presenting 
thoughts on the issues outlined in the position paper. It remains unclear whether this 
has been done intentionally in order to distract the attention from its alleged extremist 
character. The confusion nevertheless sparked a thorough discussion among various 
actors on Pegida’s sincere character. Placing the Dresden-based movement in the 
tradition of protest movements in Germany, Pegida is certainly not a unique 
phenomenon in the context of social movement studies. Yet, the digital opportunities 
at hand including the potential communicative power of social media positively 
enhance the means of disseminating information and promoting objectives in a 
sophisticated way. As a result, Pegida relies on Facebook as a strong collective 
vehicle which enforces its mobilising strategy, making the Dresden-based movement 
a peculiar protest movement. 
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2. The triangle of Pegida, the refugee crisis and the EU 
 
Whereas previous chapter unveiled the story and motives behind Pegida, mostly in a 
national context, this chapter will link the Dresden-based movement to Germany’s 
political situation within Europe and examine the relationship to the EU. 
 
2.1. Refugee crisis leaves EU states divided  
 
The EU is struggling to find an agreement on how to handle the refugee crisis. 
Thousands of refugees are trying to find their way to Europe, by sea (arriving in 
Spain, Portugal, Lampedusa, Malta, Sicily, Greece etc.) and over land borders 
(Bulgaria, and even via Russia to non-EU state Norway). Many of them fled civil 
wars in Syria and Libya, political oppression or armed conflicts.59 According to 
EuroActiv – which based its conclusions on findings of German magazine Die Welle, 
approximately 1.28 million illegal immigrants were recorded to have entered the EU 
between January and November 2015.60 Some prominent European figures like the 
Greek Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, spoke of the worst refugee 
crisis since the Second World War.61 When looking at violent break-ups related to 
post-war Europe in the past, the number of refugees in the current crisis, however, 
does not surpass the exodus from the former Yugoslavia displacing millions of people 
and killing hundreds of thousands throughout the 1990s.62 Nevertheless, EU member 
states appeared heavily divided over the issue of taking in refugees. That was the 
occasion for the European Commission to take action and to release the European 
Agenda on Migration in May 2015. By calling for a set of measures and a consistent 
common policy, the Commission aimed to “restore confidence in our [the EU’s] 
ability to bring together Europeans and national efforts to address migration, to meet 																																																								
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our [EU’s] international and ethical obligations and to work together in an effective 
way, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility”.63 Even 
if the number of refugees arriving in Europe is ‘small’ in comparison to those hosted 
by ‘states of first asylum’ outside the EU, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, it still 
appears a daunting task to share the refugee burden fairly among EU member states.64 
It mainly puts huge pressure on the states of first arrival, in accordance with the 
Dublin system that determines these EU states responsible to examine asylum 
applications, with thousands of refugees disappearing into ‘illegality’ somewhere in 
the Schengen area. The Commission stated that the Dublin system is to be revised in 
2016.65 Moreover, the European Agenda on Migration report consisted of ten so-
called action points that pleaded for, amongst others, targeting criminal smuggling 
networks. The High Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini, proposed options 
for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to ‘identify, 
capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers’.66 With the assistance of Frontex and 
Europol, this needed to be done by strengthening the JOT MARE mission that battles 
against refugee smuggling. Furthermore, a comprehensive permanent system will be 
set up to share the responsibility for large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 
among member states. The first step was taken when the Commission came up with a 
legislative proposal in September 2015 to relocate 120.000 people ‘in clear need of 
international protection’.67 In response to the high volumes of refugees entering the 
EU, German Chancellor Merkel meanwhile took the lead and stated that all Syrian 
refugees are welcome (“Wir schaffen das”) to Germany.68 In both her own country 
and in other member states, Merkel’s words provoked a wide variety of reactions. 
According to Ellis, a journalist of The Independent, this declaration was Merkel’s 
‘Mother Teresa’ moment, but could simultaneously entail the death knell for the EU 
as ‘a non-imperial empire’ (as former Commission President Barosso called it once), 
because a number of member states chose to close their borders rather than following 																																																								
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the same pathway.69 The division became more apparent at the EU summit on 22 
September 2015 where the focus lay on strengthening the Union’s external borders as 
well as overcoming the hostility of predominantly ‘the Visegrad four’, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who were adamant not to accept the 
Commission proposal for sharing the refugee burden.70 Probably the most discussed 
issue in German media in October 2015 was the clash between Merkel, head of the 
conservatives (CDU), and her colleague Seehofer, leader of the conservatives in 
southern state of Bayern (CSU), who publicly criticized her open door policy opting 
for an emergency brake on refugee flows (“Mehr geht nicht”). 71  As Seehofer 
addressed the Landtag parliament in Bayern in October 2015, he called for the set up 
of so-called transit zones, in which refugees are held at the border crossings to 
examine whether they are allowed to enter the Union.72 According to Seehofer, if 
Merkel stuck to her generous political standpoint towards refugees, this would only 
enforce the popularity of ‘anti-Islam movement’ Pegida.73 In an attempt to dissociate 
from the Dresden-based movement, Seehofer made Pegida suddenly the central topic 
at the parliamentary speech deploying it as an ‘instrument of pressure’ to push his 
own argument: if Merkel does not alter her policy, resistance against refugees will 
only rise and even worse things might happen.  
 
2.2. How Pegida and the EU relate to each other 
 
A striking thing about Pegida is that - despite people outside of Dresden ostensibly 
seem less sensitive to anti-Islam rhetoric given the lower turnouts in places such as 
Bonn and Düsseldorf74 - Pegida has increasingly gained (mostly negative) attention 
from prominent politicians at the ‘Bundeslevel’, who openly reject the movement as 																																																								
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such. Following Merkel’s line of reasoning, Thomas De Maizière, German Minister 
of Internal Affairs, sharply criticized Pegida in October 2015 setting the organisers 
aside as ‘hard-core right-extremists’. This was in stark contrast to one year earlier 
when he rose in defence of Pegida supporters stating that he took their concerns 
seriously.75 As a result, Pegida, which once started as a small regional initiative, has 
now evolved into a nation-wide discussed topic. It therefore brings back the question 
of what kind of movement Pegida is in terms of its geographical identity.   
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea of marches against the 
‘Islamisation’ of Europe brought also people in other places to the streets, but it still 
remains unclear if Pegida can be labelled as a particular geographical phenomenon. 
According to Werz and Koschkar, Pegida is a Dresden, Sachsen, East German, pan-
German, and even a pan-European phenomenon. They contended that Pegida is first 
and foremost a Dresden phenomenon, because there is hardly any place more 
conservative than Dresden where people tightly hold to the memory of the ‘old’ 
Dresden before the 1945 bombardments. Also, from the start Pegida supporters held 
up signs saying “Dresden zeigt, wie’s geht” (Dresden shows how it works). Pegida 
can also be seen as a Sachsen phenomenon, for discontent with the Berlin centrum 
reigns as the slogan ‘Wir Sind das Volk’ copied from the 1989 protests insists. 
Furthermore, (the more radical) Legida in Leipzig - located in western part of Sachsen 
- demonstrates an almost equally strong commitment (compared to Dresden) to turn 
up at the marches. Pegida could also be regarded an East German phenomenon. As 
Prof.dr. Harmut Rosa already implied, protests like Pegida are more likely to take 
place in East Germany than in the western part of the country. Werz and Koschkar 
argued that it is due to the fact that East German citizens generally do not have a 
connection with religion, which could possibly lead to antipathy towards ‘the other’. 
Furthermore, the missing link with (mostly Islam as) religion generates certain 
prejudice towards non-Christian (including Muslim) refugees. In addition, Werz and 
Koschkar concluded that places where there are relatively the fewest foreigners, the 
fear of foreigners usually is the strongest. In the case of East Germany, a large part of 
the citizens see foreigners as intruders endangering the unity of the region, resulting 
in a greater fear of ‘Vereinigungsverlieren’ (loss of unity). Pegida is thought be a pan-																																																								
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German phenomenon as well, because there is the ubiquity of collective suspicion 
(both in the east and the west of Germany) towards the elitist politicians depicting the 
‘electoral gap’ with particular parts of the population. Last but not least, Pegida can 
be conceived as a pan-European phenomenon, since the question of ‘ungesteuerte’ 
(uncontrolled) immigration sparked as much controversy as the fear of ‘Europa von 
oben’ (Europe from above). Though similar movements in Austria, Switzerland and 
Spain did not bring as many people to the streets as Pegida in Dresden, and as, to a 
lesser extent, in Leipzig.76 Despite these sister movements vary in success and do not 
even come close to Pegida’s popularity in Dresden, the Charlie Hebdo attacks do have 
instigated the emergence of dozens of new sister movements in other European 
countries, as France, Norway, Belgium, Spain and the UK, of which some appeared to 
spread the message effectively. At the start of February 2015, the Pegida UK 
Facebook page had been liked more than 12.000.77 As reflected in the previous 
chapter, one should nevertheless take into account that Pegida’s popularity, either 
abroad or in Germany, can be discernibly affected by unexpected events as the 
Charlie Hebdo killings, which to a great extent determine how many people turn up at 
the Monday night marches.        
 Clearly, Pegida has no longer limited itself just to Germany. By the end of 
January 2016, Bachmann and Festerling spoke in Roztoky, a small Czech town near 
Prague, where the Dresden-based movement brought the idea to life to organise an 
anti-Islam march across Europe on 6 February to be held in Austria, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia.78Ascertaining that Pegida has, 
perhaps unconsciously, grown into a pan-European movement, it is interesting to 
examine closely how Pegida is related to the EU. The Dresden-based movement 
posted on its Facebook page on 10 September 2015 a new ten-bullet point programme 
entitled ‘German asylum politics’. Although it seemed as if Pegida merely focused on 
national politics regarding the acceptance and integration of refugees in national 
context, terms such as ‘Europe’, ‘EU’, ‘Brussels’, ‘the European Council’ and the 
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adjective ‘European’ [officials] are all together mentioned ten times. 79  When 
comparing this programme (henceforth named the 2015 programme) with the 
previously published manifesto (hereinafter referred to as the 2014 manifesto), both 
rest on mostly the same standpoints involving the EU to play a significant role. A 
returning remark in the 2015 programme concerns the issue of ‘Islamisation’. In 
contrast with the 2014 manifesto, point eight reflects a more fierce argument against 
Muslim refugees insisting that the refugee crisis needs to be resolved through the 
adoption of Muslim refugees by ‘wealthy Sharia-paradises’ Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
United Arab Emirates, rather than EU states taking in non-Christian refugees. 
According to the 2015 programme, these ‘stone-throwing and giant Sharia paradises’ 
are better suited to accommodate the “crowds of Muslim asylum seekers, than a 
Europe of nonbelievers”. 80 Furthermore, the 2015 programme appeared also more 
decisive in distributing refugees. While the 2014 manifesto advocated a European 
distribution key in terms of sharing equally the burden on all EU member states, the 
2015 programme includes the call for an immediate stop for asylum seekers and the 
call for an urgent German asylum law (point one), setting a maximum of adopting 
2,000 refugees per year instead of taking in one million refugees.81 This demonstrates 
the radically altered locus of Pegida towards Germany’s European course and the EU 
given the resolute rejection of the (Commission’s) distribution key against the 
backdrop of the ongoing refugee crisis.  
 
2.3. Pegida as a Eurosceptic movement  
 
With the publication of the 2015 programme, Pegida has moved swiftly to become a 
one-issue protest movement: it appears that Pegida aims to address more intensively 
the issue of Muslim refugees, rather than focusing on points raised in the 2014 
manifesto such as sexual self-determination (point twelve) and gender mainstreaming 
(point seventeen). A feasible explanation can be found in the fact that the EU and the 
members - despite joint efforts in the form of, among other things, the European 																																																								
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Agenda on Migration - still have not found an appropriate means to cope with the 
influx of refugees, of which Muslims are believed to form a considerable part. By 
zooming in on the relationship with the EU, Pegida has some critical remarks 
concerning the involvement of ‘Brussels’ in German migration and asylum politics. 
Reiterating a recurring issue, one indirect critique is that the EU should not resolve 
the issue within ‘its own borders, but locally outside the Union’ (point eight). 
Pegida’s demand therefore is the immediate abolition of the Schengen area and the 
restoration of national borders as some EU states already started border controls 
(point two). 82 It is obvious that Pegida and the EU clearly do not think very much 
along the same lines, but to what extent can Pegida be conceived as an anti-EU or 
eurocritical movement? Before scrutinising this matter in relation with Pegida, it is 
useful to look at the definition of Euroscepticism and the academic background. 
Whereas Eurosceptiscim was already detected in the 1970s, it only appeared on the 
agenda of EU researchers in the mid-1990s a few years after the launch of the 
Maastricht Treaty. This coincided with the emergence of the debate on democratic 
deficit: the claim that supranational EU institutions led by bureaucratic technocrats 
fell short of fulfilling the principles of democracy.83 According to Leconte, there was 
a certain correlation between the EU’s democratic deficit and Euroscepticism; in fact, 
the latter was the consequence of the former. Various scholars studying 
Euroscepticism across the EU, amongst others Szczerbiak and Taggart, argued that in 
the build-up to the 2004 enlargement some important differences were revealed about 
how European integration was viewed. This perception culminated in the referendums 
on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands one year later when a sign 
of ‘popular disquiet with the EU’ was expressed.84 Whether it was to be the turning 
point in European integration or not, it is certainly an historical benchmark not 
particularly in favour of further European cooperation, and one that changed ‘ever 
closer union’ thinking among EU member states.  
Emanating from the research on Euroscepticism by EU scholars two dominant 
schools arose, notably the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. Whereas 																																																								
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Szczerbiak and Taggart belong to the first school, scholars such as Hooghe and Marks 
are attached to the latter. Both Szczerbiak and Taggart and Hooghe and Marks 
extensively examined and compared party-based Euroscepticism in European politics. 
Pegida might not be conceived as a political party, but it certainly touched upon a 
range of highly sensitive political topics, such as immigration and asylum. Hence, the 
analysis of party-based Euroscepticism can be applied on the Dresden-based 
movement. Without going too much into detail, it is useful to highlight some relevant 
aspects in the academic work that both schools stand for. 85  As the term 
Euroscepticism contained doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in 
general, Hooghe and Marks concurred with Szczerbiak and Taggart in perceiving 
Euroscepticism as holding an array of “critical positions on European integration, as 
well outright opposition”.86 In ‘Opposing Europe?’, which was published in two 
volumes, Szczerbiak and Taggart discussed the distinction between two types of 
Euroscepticism, what they coined ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft Euroscepticism’. While Hard 
Euroscepticism encompasses “where there is a principled opposition to the EU and 
European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties 
should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount 
to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently 
conceived”, Soft Euroscepticism includes “where there is no principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of 
policy areas lead to expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a 
sense of ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with EU’s trajectory”.87 According to 
Mudde, there, however, is some lack of clarity in constructing a clear division 
between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, examining whether it should be the quantity 
or quality of the opposed policies. In turn, Szczerbiak and Taggart claimed that it 
should rather be based on the scrutiny of ‘the core parts of the European project’, 
leaving the qualitative/quantitative issue open to discussion. 88  Although this 
explanation nevertheless is a bit vague, it simultaneously creates space to identify the 
core parts of the European project one prefers to focus on. In the case of Pegida, the 																																																								
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recurrent themes are asylum, immigration and integration (all three inextricably 
linked to ‘Islamisation’) being indispensable parts of the European project today. 
These are also closely related to the issue of refugees as discussed in the first section 
of this chapter. Instead of being a core part of the European project, the refugee crisis 
has rather developed into a core problem for the European project, because a large 
number of EU members appeared to be incapable or unwilling to manage the influx of 
refugees. In this respect, one could suggest that the refugee crisis has rather enforced 
Pegida’s support in mostly the eastern part of Germany, as Pegida gained 
considerable support there. When examining both the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 
programme, one, furthermore, sees a remarkable change of standpoint regarding the 
refugee crisis and the EU. Whereas the 2014 manifesto called for a common 
European distribution system for refugees and a fair way of sharing refugees among 
EU member states clearly in support of a distribution key (point four), the 2015 
programme radically altered this viewpoint calling for the suspension of the Schengen 
Treaty and adopting an immediate German asylum ‘emergency’ law (point one and 
two).89 Based on the alteration in the standpoint on refugees of the latter programme, 
it could even be argued that due to the refugee crisis Pegida opted for tougher 
measures in terms of not taking in any (Muslim) refugees and demanding a cap of 
refugees in general. An unconventional rally in Sachsen in October 2015 largely 
confirmed this ‘in practice’, as Pegida had mobilised thousands citizens in order to 
create ‘a human border’ against refugees arriving in the city of Sebnitz close to the 
German-Czech border.90         
 Thus, in the first instance, Pegida did not seem unsympathetic towards a 
‘European solution’ of the distribution of refugees in terms of its explicit statement 
including being the ‘patriots for Europe sharing equal rights and duties’. 91 Clearly, 
the 2014 manifesto took a critical stance on the current course of the EU, without 
fully rejecting the EU as a whole per se. This is in stark contrast to the statement in 
the 2015 programme, in which Pegida called for stricter controls of national borders 																																																								
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and condemned the ‘completely failed Dublin system which goes almost entirely at 
the cost of Germany’. As for the collaboration with other EU states, the programme, 
moreover, states that if there will be resistance against ‘our German asylum policies’; 
Germany needed to answer by immediately leaving the EU.92 This latter point implies 
that the Dresden-based movement in fact is far more Eurosceptic than previously 
pointed out. Based on the 2015 programme, conceiving ‘patriotic’ Pegida as a Hard 
Eurosceptic movement, however, would not be entirely accurate, since it pleads for 
the EU to work out a solution outside the Union’s borders. Notwithstanding, Pegida 
indeed possesses elements of Hard Euroscepticism displayed by mainly the 2015 
programme. In addition, Pegida certainly opposes the EU because the Union 
embodies a supranational ‘enemy’, which runs counter to Pegida’s national interests 
(hard Euroscepticism). However, at the same time, the Dresden-based movement 
demonstrates characteristics of soft Euroscepticism given that the EU is seen as 
problematic as long as its development is in conflict with Pegida’s interests.93 
Accordingly, one could conclude from this that Pegida was to support the Union if the 
latter would operate at the will of the movement.    
 
2.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter showed that the refugee crisis has left EU members heavily divided. 
Especially the matter of ‘fairly’ distributing refugees among each other provoked an 
immense outcry. To what extent the refugee crisis has enforced Pegida’s popularity in 
terms of growing numbers of supporters is hard to tell. However, as also reflected in 
the previous chapter, attendance levels of Pegida marches did go up in times of 
growing numbers of refugees into Germany in the autumn of 2015. Apart from the 
probable correlation, it is clear that prominent national politicians labelled Pegida as 
dangerous to German society and to the country’s position in EU politics. However it 
may be, Pegida increasingly gained more attention as an anti-establishment protest 
movement, to a great part due to the same politicians. By comparing a couple of 
relevant EU-related issue in the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 programme, it is 																																																								
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noticeable that Pegida radically changed its course on the Union. The refugee crisis 
laid bare that Pegida’s standpoints are inextricably bound to the EU’s policy on 
asylum and immigration and has simultaneously demonstrated that the movement 
drastically altered its position on allowing non-Christian (including Muslim) refugees 
into Germany. As a result of the change in direction of the 2015 programme, Pegida 
wholeheartedly expressed its strong disapproval of the EU present political course, 
even implying that Germany should implement its own asylum rules and abandon, 
amongst others, the Dublin system or rather leave the EU. Putting it in Szczerbiak and 
Taggart’s distinction, it is remarkably evident to see that Pegida has shifted from a 
Soft Eurosceptic attitude to less EU-friendly stance incorporating elements of Hard 
Euroscepticism and focusing as a single-issue movement merely on the asylum, 
immigration and integration.    
 
Chapter 3: How is Pegida portrayed in the German media? 
 
As previous chapter captured the triangle of this thesis including Pegida, the refugee 
crisis and the EU, it is useful to place Pegida’s development into a more specific 
context by looking at how Germany has dealt with refugees and asylum policies, and 
how the media generally report on the issue of immigration and asylum seekers in 
Germany, and Pegida, in order to find out to what extent media coverage affects the 
movement.  
 
3.1. Understanding German’s position on immigration 
 
In order to get a hold of Germany’s relationship towards immigrants, one should first 
capture the understanding of how media generally tend to report on migrant-related 
issues. According to Chouliaraki, this usually happens to be twofold. On the one 
hand, the refugee is defined as a sufferer who “raises the moral claim to cosmopolitan 
solidarity”, whereas, on the other hand, refugees are often depicted as a threat who 
endangers the nation’s unity.94 In other words, there is ambivalence in perceiving the 
refugee in the media. Accordingly, the representation of the refugee as a ‘speechless’ 																																																								
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creature is a rather negative critique as it is attached to the notion of ‘those who do not 
belong’, while the ‘utopian’ agency of the refugee is seen as a critique of positive 
representation in terms of ‘hopeful self-determination’. What both strategies of 
representations have in common, tough, is the fact that they seek to resolve the 
ambivalence of the refugee as an ‘ethnic-political signifier’, that brings together the 
‘common humanity’ as a justification for acting upon the refugee’s suffering.95 
Nevertheless, both representations have been accused of ‘dehumanising’ refugees 
given that they tend to conceal the real story behind refugees, “depriving each 
individual refugee of her/his own quality of humanity”.96 When looking at the post-
war period in Germany, the subject of immigrants and refugees has always been a 
contentious one, especially after the reunification in 1989. The reunion of East and 
West Germany largely coincided with an upsurge of violence from mostly neo-Nazi 
related groups. Due to the high unemployment rate in the former East Germany, these 
groups were able to recruit new members and spread xenophobic sentiments mainly 
against Turks already living in Germany as a result of the labour recruitment contract 
between West Germany and Turkey in 1961.97 The early 1990s saw a sharp increase 
of neo-Nazi assaults against – again - mostly the Turkish community resulting in 849 
reported acts in 1991, a five-fold increase from the 1990 figures, to a doubled number 
of approximately 1,500 in 1992. Perhaps more alarming, it was thought that the spate 
of attacks in Mölln (November 1992) and Solingen (May 1993) more westwards, 
killing eight people, were inspired by events occurred in the east. 98 Among all the 
places where racist crimes were committed, the Sachsen city of Hoyerswerda 
probably became the most symbolic for the outright violence against immigrants and 
the ever-present neo-Nazi sympathies in the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). Neo-Nazi groups carried out a series of attacks on migrant dwellings during 
1991 leading to a flight of migrants to Berlin and Niedersachsen. Subsequently, these 
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neo-Nazi figures declared Hoyerswerda “the first migrant-free city”, which would 
become eventually the “Unwort des Jahres” (the taboo word of the year) in 1991.99  
At the same time, Europe faced a rising number of people applying for asylum 
largely due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wars in Yugoslavia in 1991. 
Due to these events, the situation was considered so serious in terms of increasing 
asylum applications that Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1992 publicly thought of 
declaring a state of emergency in Germany. The Conservative leader of Germany 
warned of “the danger of a profound crisis of confidence in our democratic state 
which crossed the threshold of our capacity”.100 According to Schuster, there is a 
striking paradox noticeable in the way Germany welcomed refugees after and before 
the reunion. By the end of 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had 
taken in the GDR after the Berlin wall had fallen, became economically the strongest 
state in Europe and also politically stable, having had only six different governments 
since the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. However, the newly 
formed Germany lead by the Kohl coalition, limited the possibilities for migrants to 
be successfully granted asylum, though as for war refugees there was adopted a 
special status.101 This was in stark contrast to the position it had taken in when it was 
still a poor country shortly after the Second World War. The horrors of the War 
displaced millions of Germans and its geographical position in the Cold War deeply 
influenced the West German asylum policy. The new Rechtstaat, the structure of the 
German state soon set up after the War, offered a generous way to respond to the 
demands of citizens, including rights for foreigners. In fact, a constitutional provision 
(Article 19 (4)) was drafted that allowed anyone, including non-German citizens, 
access to the German courts.102 Also, Article 16 (2) 2 was implemented to ensure that 
the post-war Germany, which had seen so many flee the atrocities on its territory, 
would be a safe haven for people who were politically prosecuted.103 When drafting 
these articles in 1949, members of the parliamentary committee in West-Germany had 
been in most cases victims of the War themselves. Schuster contended that they, 																																																								
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however, could not have foreseen that the basic right outlined in, inter alia, Article 16 
and 19 would have been invoked to such a great extent in order to gain asylum in the 
beginning of the 1990s.104 Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany had received 
applications that fluctuated considerably, from roughly 100,000 in 1980 to less than 
20,000 three years later, until in 1992 the number of applicants rose to 400,000. 
Followed by the reunification and the relaxation of the Soviet borders, 2,5 million 
ethnic Germans entered unrestrictedly and claimed full citizenship rights, though 
limits on the entry would later be put in place. Clearly, this latter group were not 
fleeing war and therefore no refugees as such, but Germany saw itself obliged to take 
them in. As far as the other claimants concerned, the majority of the refugees were not 
genuine politically prosecuted refugees, but rather people who sought brighter 
prospects in economic sense.105       
 Throughout the 1990, Germany, that saw a mild economic boom, had to cope 
with the daunting task of integrating the indigenous population (East Germans), the 
returnees (Germans refugees) and the newcomers (non-German refugees from mostly 
former Yugoslav countries) into one single country.106 In the wake of Kohl’s speech, 
Manfred Kanther, interior minister of the Kohl cabinet, enforced the words of his 
Chancellor. Against the backdrop of the soaring violence towards the Turkish 
migrants, Kanther chose more or less the same line of argument as Alfred Degger, the 
then-head of the CDU in Hesse in 1982, pressing for Turkish ‘guest workers’ to go 
‘home’ and to reserve “what is left mainly for the Germans”. According to Der 
Spiegel, two political parties in 1992 became increasingly at odds over Turkish 
immigrants and refugees. The newsmagazine contended that, on the one hand, Kohl’s 
CDU displayed “the crudely xenophobic rhetoric of large sentiments within the 
party”, while the Green Party demanded “a multicultural society and a right of 
residence for all”.107 This rift demonstrated the highly sensitive and ongoing debate 
on how to deal with asylum seekers. Furthermore, it showed that the media tend to 
report in very black-and-white terms. Sticking to the critical migrant policy, Kohl 																																																								
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expressed to Tagesspiegel in 1996 that “whoever abuses his right to hospitality will 
have to leave this country”. Schuster contended that the use of Kohl’s vocabulary was 
politically loaded as it was reminiscent of the way the Nazis put it: “Persons who are 
not citizens [Staatsbürger] can live in Germany only as guests and must be subject to 
legislation governing foreigners”. 108  As Cohen argued, one was terrified to be 
compared to such horrific elements, as the Nazi past had long thwarted any ideas of 
German national identity and history.109 Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the 
urgent question of integration became more pressing and the tension on the political 
level became ever more tangible. In the run-up to the state election of Hesse in 1999, 
CDU politician Roland Koch provoked widespread controversy with a petition 
campaign to abolish the possibility for migrants of holding dual citizenship in order to 
take away doubts about integrity. Alongside fierce criticisms in the media, the 
Socialists, Liberals, Greens and even members of Koch’s own conservative party 
heavily condemned the plan for being xenophobic and populist, since this would 
rather work counterproductive.110 Manz stated that Germany, after the millennium, 
still has been struggling to get a hold of the delicate question of what to call German. 
One thing was for certain; migrants had put down “the springboard for a fully-fledged 
debate about German identity” and integration. Accordingly, the then parliamentary 
leader of the CDU, Friedrich Merz, brought about the Leitkultur discussion (Merz 
however did not invent the term himself) in 2000. According to Merz, the Leitkultur 
stands for the dominant national culture to which Germany as the host society adheres 
and which should serve as a guideline for foreigners that would eventually foster 
assimilation of the latter group into Germany.111 In subsequent years, the debate on 
national identity remained a hot-button issue, including remarks of the CSU Prime 
Minister, Edmund Stoiber in 2002 on the fear over losing German culture expressed 
in terms of Durchrassung and Überfremdung.112 Coming back to the distinction made 
earlier between refugees in public discourse, it is clear that Germany faced an 
unsettled history full of ethnic hatred, racist violence and resistance denoting the 																																																								
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extremely sensitive issue of foreigners in Germany. Whereas neo-Nazi groups are still 
visible today, German media do their utmost to condemn attacks against refugees and 
refugee houses. Several prominent journalists, such as ADR host Anja Reschke, have 
called out to stop racist remarks against refugees on social media.113 With hundreds or 
even thousands of refugees coming to Germany each day in 2015, the four largest 
German nation-wide media, Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, SDZ and Die Welt, rather tended to report on the refugee as a ‘sufferer’ 
than as a ‘threat’ in order to give the refugee crisis a face. Tough these media are not 
necessarily seeing things through rose-coloured glasses, news items usually cover 
personal stories of the refugees on their way to Germany.114 When taking into account 
the challenges, crises and catastrophes Germany had been facing during its post-war 
history ranging from the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the 
reunification, it is explainable why Angela Merkel, herself born in East Germany, 
took the decision to push her country towards a more progressive migration policy. 
Although her ‘wir schaffen das’ speech provoked an immense backlash, including a 
rift with colleague Seehofer, Die Welt journalist Poschardt argued that Merkel has put 
herself in the tradition among the “Deutsche und Unionisten als ein Kollektiv des 
Gelingens” (The collective success of the Germans and unionists), in which Adenauer 
successfully ruled Germany during the Cold War and Kohl gave strong impetus to the 
unity of Germany.115  
 
3.2. The online revolution of traditional newspapers  
 
Having only touched the tip of the iceberg regarding Germany’s history of asylum 
and immigration, the previous section, nonetheless, demonstrated how the past has 
shaped the way media tend to report on the issue. On the other hand, media are 
considered to be an autonomously influential force. According to De Vreese, media in 																																																								
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general have traditionally had the role as agenda setter, tough the notion of the media 
as news framer also acquired considerable support. As a result, the media “may not 
only influence what citizens think about” (agenda setting), but also “how they think 
about a certain issue (news framing)”.116 Taking this into account, mass media, 
including any means of communication – as newspapers and television - have played 
a significant role in disseminating news and imparting information for over sixty 
years. According to McNamara, they are believed to have far-reaching effects, 
provoking violence, sexual promiscuity and fostering discrimination against women, 
so as leading to corporate collapses, fall in sales of products and even bringing down 
presidents.117 As the media work as agenda setter and news framer, Riffe, Lacy and 
Fico, moreover, suggested that newspapers rely heavily on other factors including “a 
news organisation’s market, the resources available for journalists, on-scene reporter 
judgements and interactions with both purposive and non-purposive sources and 
decisions about presentation style, structure, emphasis, and language”.118 Since the 
digital revolution, traditional newspapers have increasingly and successfully enabled 
the use of online news services. Accordingly, online news sites that are connected 
with traditional media branches appeal to a large readership.119 Yet, despite online 
communications having undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of newspapers 
and attracted mostly young readers to create an environment whereby news can be 
read every second of every day, Skogerbø and Winsvold contended that the 
predictions of the demise of traditional print newspaper have not (yet) come true.120 
Although media analysts and researchers have still not found an answer to the 
question whether traditional newspapers can be reinvented on a digital platform, daily 
newspapers have, thus, been succeeding to reach an (younger) audience on the 
Internet.  
As we look at the German media landscape, Bild and SDZ can be seen as 
respectable traditional newspapers, tough having wholly different backgrounds. Since 																																																								
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the Second World War, the most-read newspapers in Germany cover a small political 
spectrum including left-wing liberals on the one side and conservatives on the other. 
Despite, or perhaps in spite of, the limited political scope, newspapers are not bound 
to any political party, unlike newspapers in states such as Italy.121 When observing 
Bild and SDZ, both fit the political spectrum with Bild bending towards the 
conservative side and SDZ leaning towards the left-wing liberals. SDZ is considered 
to be the largest nation-wide subscription newspaper in Germany and one of the two – 
next to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - major Qualitätskaufzeitungen (quality 
newspapers).122 Every day SDZ reaches 1,16 million both national and international 
readers. Furthermore, the Munich newspaper has got regional branches throughout 
Germany, including Berlin, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Hamburg and Stuttgart, and is 
thought to be an “opinion-forming news medium with a local and regional anchorage, 
the principles of liberalism, tolerance and editorial independence”.123 On the other 
hand, there is Bild, which is conceived as more controversial given that it is a 
Boulevardzeitung (popular newspaper or tabloid) differentiating itself from the quality 
newspapers in the way that it rather raises subjects on the front page associated with 
gossip, sex, and crime. Whereas quality papers as SDZ generally appeal less to young 
readers, this particular readership finds Bild more accessible due to the easy, pictorial 
and entertaining stories.124 Unlike SDZ, Bild traditionally set an anti-communist tone 
in news stories while nowadays claiming a more conservative and cynical position. 125 
As the media possess a powerful means, Artl and Storz asserted that “everyone wants 
to stay on good terms with Bild, for there is a massive fear of being portrayed 
negatively especially among politicians”.126 Bild therefore constitutes a ‘dangerous 
political instrument’, which not only has the power of describing Germany, but also 
of breaking it.127 Whereas Bild, as a tabloid, aims to sell as many newspapers as 
possible by publishing scandalous news stories, SDZ articles usually rest more on in-
depth research and well-balanced considerations. This is also what one could see 																																																								
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reflected in the main goals of Bild’s publishing house Axel Springer, the tabloid has 
twelve times as many readers, an estimated number of 12 million.128  
 
3.3. How Bild and SDZ portray Pegida   
 
Having discussed two opposing newspapers, an online content analysis has been 
carried out through the assumption of two hypotheses, one for both Bild and SDZ. 
Although academics from an array of disciplines including communications, history, 
language studies, political science and social science use content analysis, it is most 
commonly conducted by communications and social scientists. 129  As a result, 
definitions of content analysis and ways to use it abound. According to the late 
behavioural scientist Berelson, content analysis contains “a technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communications”.130 The use of quantitative content analysis in particular provides 
numerous advantages. According to the Riffe, Lacy and Fico, this technique sets to 
take messages that are “separate and apart from communicators and receivers”. 
Subsequently, “the researcher can draw conclusions from the content evidence 
without having to gain access to communicators who may be unwilling or unable to 
be examined directly”.131 Moreover, Wodak and Busch stressed the importance of 
sociological variables that are seen as relevant for an interpretation, or explanation of 
a certain text.132 Kerlinger supported this view by adding that content analysis is “a 
method of studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective, and 
quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables”.133    
 By highlighting various variables (such as religion, party affiliation, gender, 
and turnout), one could measure and test to what extent a particular hypothesis can be 
perceived as valid. The content analysis on Bild and SDZ has delved into a few 
variables, which will be given in the next paragraphs. Before doing so, the sampling 
of the selected online articles requires some explanation. Wang and Riffe contended 																																																								
128 Bild. BILD und die Fakten  [last accessed 11 January 2016. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/digital/bild-zeitung-druck/bildzeitung/bild-und-die-fakten-7356678.bild.html. 
129 Prasad, Devi. 2008. "Content Analysis. A method of Social Science Research." CSS: pp.5. 
130 Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, Frederick Fico. 2014. Analyzing Media Messages. Using Quantitative 
Content Analysis in Research. New York: Routledge. pp.19. 
131 Ibid. pp.30.  
132 Ruth Wodak, Brigitta Busch. 2004. "Approaches to media texts." In The SAGE handbook of media 
studies, edited by D. McQuail J. Downing, P. Schlesinger, & E. Wartella pp.108. 
133Prasad, Devi. 2008. "Content Analysis. A method of Social Science Research." CSS: pp.2. 
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that the purpose of sampling is to render “a manageable subset from a large 
population or sampling frame to represent that population”. An ideal sample, in their 
opinion, involves “a trade-off between the ease of study and the representation of the 
population”.134 Since the foundation on 11 October 2014, Pegida has been hotly 
debated in German media. By skimming through the archives on Bild’s and SDZ’s 
websites and setting the period from 11 October 2014 until 30 November 2015, 
‘Pegida’ appears to be mentioned in respectively 700 and 1690 articles. It is, however, 
debatable whether these results are entirely accurate. As a result, it is hard to decide 
which sample size studies should embrace. Whereas search engines, such as Google, 
tend not to generate random results, this thesis has systematically chosen a dozen 
online news articles each month from both Bild and SDZ in order to avoid any bias or 
preference. While Bild already published its first article on 11 November 2014 
reporting on the “Krawall-Angst in der Innenstadt” (fear of riots in the city centre),135 
SDZ only put online on 3 December 2014 its first piece on Pegida, “Rechts orientierte 
Wutbürger” (right-wing angry citizen).136 Hence, the period of December 2014 until 
November 2015 has been taken as timeframe for this research project, mapping out 
precisely an array of crucial events including the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the fracture 
in Pegida’s camp between Oertel and Bachmann, Pegida’s political rapprochement 
with the AfD, Merkel’s welcoming statement, and the soaring numbers of refugees in 
the autumn of 2015, of which each unquestionably affected Pegida’s popularity. 
Hence, as for the sample size, one online article of each month has been singled out 
from the website archives, encompassing twelve pieces each both for Bild and SDZ.   
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
134 Xiaopeng Wang, Daniel Riffe. An Exploration of Sample Sizes for Content Analysis of the New York 
Times Web Site. WJMCR, 20 May 2010 [last accessed 10 January 2016. Available from 
http://wjmcr.org/vol20. 
135 Bild, Sten Hornig, Christian Fischer  Krawall-Angst in der Innenstadt, 17 November 2014 [last 
accessed 12 January 2016. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/demonstrationen/angst-
vor-krawallen-38594838.bild.html. 
136 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Cornelius Pollmer, Jens Schneider, Jan Bielicki. Rechts orientierte 
Wutbürger, 3 December 2014 [last accessed 13 January 2016. Available from 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/demos-gegen-islamisten-rechts-orientierte-wutbuerger-1.2248894. 
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Bild 
 
Tabloids are thought to speak the language of the ‘ordinary’ man. It is frequently 
stated that speaking to the ordinary man is a powerful tool for success.137 In the case 
of Bild, this is no different. In fact, Bild resembles Pegida in the respect of standing 
up for the ordinary man and raising ‘the people’s voice’.138 According to Brichta, the 
formula of British tabloids is “old and tried, compounded of police court reporting, 
amazing revelations, and a political point of view that was generally populist, hostile 
to the rich, the aristocracy, and the monarchy”.139 Most of these elements perfectly 
match Bild, but one important aspect is missing. Jäger asserted that Bild is 
traditionally against foreigners and “tires itself never of attacking an discriminating 
against immigrants, using suggestive symbols and images like that of the threatening 
‘flood of asylum-seekers’, who will make ‘our boat’ sink”.140 By keeping this 
indispensible element in mind, the following hypothesis has been employed: 
 
As Bild is traditionally seen as critical towards refugees and immigrants, the tabloid 
supports Pegida’s position in terms of reporting in favour of the Dresden-based 
movement  
 
In order to test his hypothesis, it is crucial to identify some variables to examine 
closely and provide a better insight into the context in which a particular term is being 
used. Based on the research question and how this thesis has been built up, four 
variables can be extracted: geographical origin, religion, political affiliation, and 
turnout. Despite the fact that these variables are inextricably related to Pegida as such, 
it ought be stressed that these variables hold separate values. Regarding geographical 
origin, it remains difficult to label Pegida as a particular geographical phenomenon. 
As we have seen, Pegida could be labelled as a Dresden, Sachsen, East German, pan-
German, and even a pan-European phenomenon. Also, the variable religion should be 
incorporated and studied. Forming the core issue of the movement’s existence, the 																																																								
137 Brichta, Mascha K. 2012. 'Love it or Loathe it': Audience Responses to Tabloids in the UK and 
Germany: Transcript Verlag. pp.206. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. pp.46. 
140 Jäger, Siegfried. 1998. "Political Discourse: The Language of Right and Left in Germany." In The 
German Language and the Real World: Sociolinguistic, Cultural, and Pragmatic Perspectives on 
Contemporary German, edited by Patrick Stevenson. Oxford University Press. pp.246. 
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outspokenly anti-Islam tone runs like a red thread through the two movement 
programmes. Furthermore, as part of the campaign, Pegida seizes any opportunity to 
mention that Germany relies on Christian-Jewish values. Concerning the third 
variable political affiliation, it is an open secret that Pegida rubs shoulders with 
Eurosceptic political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). And finally, the 
variable turnout has been decisive in terms of the Monday night demonstrations 
determining the success of the movement.  
As the variables have been justified, the online content analysis has singled 
out a number of terms related to these variables in the context of Pegida. The term 
‘Pegida’ (nor its full name “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes”) itself has not been taken into account, since all terms incorporated are 
inextricably linked to Pegida. As for geographical origin-related terms141, they are 
altogether named 58 times, followed by religion (33)142, turnout (26)143 and political 
affiliation (18).144 Clearly, the definition of geographical origin has produced a larger 
number of results than the other variables. This has one important implication. 
Despite being a phenomenon originated from Dresden, Bild’s content confirmed that 
Pegida has evolved into a nation-wide discussed topic. In “Nein zu Pegida!” (No to 
Pegida) on 6 January 2015, Bild conducted interviews with famous Germans who 
raised their voice against Pegida. While one might have expected otherwise, Bild 																																																								
141 The selection of geographical origin-related terms (some of them have been mentioned twice or 
more) embraces ‘Dresden’, ‘München’, ‘Bonn’, ‘Würzberg’, ‘Ausländerfeindlichkeit’, ‘Kassel’, 
‘Kadiga’, ‘Schleswig-Holstein’, ‘Leipzig’, ‘Dresdner’, ‘Sachsen Polizei’, ‘Zuwanderer’, ‘Hetz-
Holländer’, ‘Ostdeutschland’, ‘Russland’, ‘Deutschlands Städte’, ‘Hamburg’, ‘Einwanderer’, 
‘Stuttgart’, ‘Berlin’, ‘Deutschland’, ‘deutschen Autoren’, ‘Türkei’, ‘Syrien’, ‘deutschen Nationalelf’, 
‘Ausländer’, ‘Überfremdung’, ‘Flüchtlingen’, ‘Minderheiten’, ‘Kulturen’, ‘Fremdenfeindlichkeit’, 
‘DDR’, ‘Asylbewerbern’, ‘Deutschen’, ‘Nationalitäten’, ‘Herkunft’, ‘multinationale Vielfalt’, 
‘Migrationshintergrund’, ‘Frankfurt’, ‘Mainz’, ‘Kulturelle Vielfalt’, ‘Neubürger’, ‘weltoffene Stadt’, 
‘Kogida’, ‘Asylbewerbern’, ‘Abspaltung Sachsens’, ‘Legida’, ‘Heidenau’, ‘Freital’, 
‘Westdeutschland’, ‘weltoffenheit’, ‘Patrioten’, ‘Krisengebieten’, ‘Ort’, ‘Entwicklungshelfer’, 
‘weltoffen’ and ‘Exportland’. 
142 The selection of religion-related terms (some have been called twice or more) encompasses 
‘islamfeindlichen’, ‘Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD)’, ‘unchristlich’, ‘Abendlandkultur’, 
‘Christentum’, ‘Heiligabend’, ‘Weihnachtsliedersingen’, ‘Christen’, ‘Muslime’, ‘Düsseldorfer 
Synagoge’, ‘Antisemitismus’, ‘Weihnachtssingen’, ‘Weihnachtsbotschaft’, ‘Islamisierung’, ‘Kirchen’, 
‘glaubens paschaul’, ‘Islam’, ‘Die Heiligen Drei Könige’, ‘Morgenland’, ‘Gott’, ‘Religion(en)’, 
‘Moslems’, ‘christlich-abendländische Kultur’, ‘religiöse Bekenntnisse’ and ‘Christ’. 
143 The selection of turnout-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) includes mainly 
numbers of demonstrations (e.g. 10.000 
Teilnehmern/Menschen/Anhänger/Demonstranten/Gegendemonstranten), but also ‘anti-Pegida 
Kundgebungen’, ‘Verantstalung(en)’, ‘Demonstration(en)’ and ‘Gida-Gänger’.  
144 The selection of political affiliation-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) 
encompasses ‘AfD’, ‘ex-AfD-politikerin’, ‘politische Organisation’, ‘CDU’, ‘große Koalition’, 
‘Regierungschefin’, ‘SPD’, ‘SPD-Generalsekretärin’, ‘Nazi-vergleich’, ‘Nato-Propaganda, politische 
Unzufriedenheit’ and ‘Nato’.  
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clearly sketched a negative image of Pegida being “against the open-minded and 
tolerant Republic of Germany”.145 What is more, Bild explicitly championed the idea 
of taking in refugees by means of a petition signed by eighty famous Germans. In 
short, the tabloid took an opposing view rather than taking Pegida’s position. 
Surprisingly enough, this is not the only criticism. When examining the article of 
“Tourismus in Dresden bricht ein!” (Tourism of Dresden collapses) on 24 June 2015, 
Bild one-sidedly blamed Pegida for contributing to the decreasing numbers of tourists 
coming to the city of Dresden.146 Another remarkable finding is that the tabloid 
readily attempts to unveil Pegida’s alleged links with neo-Nazism, as two almost 
identical articles, though published at different times, suggest. Both pieces, entitled 
“Ex-Pegida-Frau blamiert sich mit Goebbels-Vergleich” (Ex-Pegida woman disgraces 
herself with Goebbels comparison) on 22 May 2015 and “Pegida-Chef vergleicht 
Justizminister Maas mit Goebbels” (Pegida boss compares minister of Justice Maas 
with Goebbels) on 2 November 2015, insist and put emphasis on the recurrence of 
neo-Nazi ‘scandals’.147  
Considering the religion-variable scores high as well, one would think that 
Bild shares the notion of stopping the ‘Islamisation’. If anything is true, it is the 
opposite, as Bild rather took in a dismissive position condemning Pegida’s anti-Islam 
course. In the article “Mit Gott gegen Pegida” (With God against Pegida) from 20 
July 2015, Bild reported on seven religions which stood up against “the hateful face 
of Pegida”. 148  Also, the tabloid tends – though to a lesser extent - to report 
enthusiastically on the lower turnouts (“Weniger Teilnehmer als erwartet!” – less 
participants than expected!) ostensibly against Pegida (“3000 gegen 700! Und wieder 
legt Leipzig Legida lahm.” – 3000 against 700! And Leipzig brings Legida to a halt 
yet again).149 As for the political affiliation variable, Bild proved not very keen on 																																																								
145 Bild. Nein zu Pegida! 6 January 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/regional/muenchen/pegida/promis-sagen-nein-zu-pegida-39214178.bild.html. 
146 Bild. Tourismus in Dresden bricht ein! 24 June 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available 
from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/wegen-pegida-tourismus-in-dresden-bricht-ein-
41476096.bild.html. 
147 Bild. Ex-Pegida-Frau blamiert sich mit Goebbels-Vergleich. 22 May 2015 [last accessed 1 
November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/maybrit-illner/talk-zu-pegida-und-
afd-lucke-wirrer-goebbels-vergleich-41051740.bild.html. 
148 Bild. Mit Gott gegen Pegida. 20 July 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/mit-gott-gegen-pegida-41856112.bild.html 
149 Bild. Und wieder legt Leipzig Legida lahm. 31 August 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. 
Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/leipzig/demonstrationen/demo-tag-in-leipzig-
42404266.bild.html. 
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reporting on Pegida’s ties with politics. The tabloid plainly condemned ex-AfD 
politician Festerling’s plan of breaking away the eastern state of Sachsen from 
Germany. By speaking of a ‘vague’ Pegida-plan doomed to fail, Bild decisively 
showed no sympathy for Pegida’s political aspirations.150 Based on the variables and 
the contextual analysis, one could hardly contend that Bild is supportive of Pegida. 
Whereas it was expected that Bild would take Pegida’s position given the former’s 
history of mostly anti-migrant reporting, the tabloid, in fact, critically opposed the 
Dresden-based movement on any of the examined variables. When looking at the 
content and the predominantly harsh tone of the twelve articles, it moreover is striking 
to conclude that Bild has been determinedly taking position against Pegida right from 
the start.   
 
SDZ 
 
Concerning Bild’s counterpart SDZ, a dozen online news articles there have been 
selected as well, one from each month in the period from December 2014 until 
November 2015. As the Munich newspaper generally earned a good reputation as 
quality newspaper and appealed more to the left-wing end of the political spectrum, it 
is less likely that SDZ would give full support to Pegida. Hence, the following 
hypothesis has been put to the test: 
 
SDZ presents a dismissive position on Pegida, criticizing the movement’s hard-core 
anti-Islam rhetoric. 
 
Like the online content analysis applied on Bild, this analysis has consistently been 
carried out through the observation of the four variables, geographical origin, religion, 
political affiliation and turnout, again without taking the term ‘Pegida’ itself into 
consideration. It turned out that the geographical origin-related (named 67 times)151 																																																								
150 Bild, Luisa Schlitter, Sten Hornig. Festerling will Sachsen von Deutschland abspalten. 12 October 
2015 [last accessed 12 October 2015. Available from 
http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/festerling-will-sachsen-von-deutschland-abspalten-
42989004.bild.html.  
151 The selection of geographical origin-related terms (some have been called twice or more) 
encompasses ‘Pegida’, ‘Dresden’, ‘Hogesa’, ‘Ostdeutschland’, Köln’, ‘Fremdfeindlichen Pegida-
Spaziergängern’, ‘Russland’, ‘Deutschland’, ‘Fremdenfeindlichkeit’, ‘Glaubenssätzen’, ‘Kirchentür’, 
‘Kreuzkirche’, ‘Wittenberg’‘Sachsen-anhalt’, ‘Niedersachsen’, ‘Sachsen’, ‘Türken’, ‘Wien’, ‘Pole’, 
‘Römer’, ‘Arminia-Typ’, ‘Cherusker’, ‘Deutschland’, ‘Germanien’, ‘Deutscher’, ‘Nation’, 
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and political affiliation-related vocabulary (59)152 were the most-discussed variables 
in this analysis, followed by turnout (21)153 and religion (15)154. Consequently, there 
are some dissimilarities to Bild traceable. Unlike the tabloid, SDZ reported 
extensively on the political affiliation with the AfD. In “Pegidas Partei” (Pegida’s 
party) on 9 October 2015, the Munich newspaper wrote about the sudden electoral 
upswing of the AfD arguing that virtually seven per cent of the voters were to support 
the Eurosceptic party nation-wide. Taking into consideration the refugee crisis, the 
authors suggested that the AfD was able to mobilise 8,000 citizens to the streets in 
Erfurt to demonstrate against Germany’s asylum policy. They, furthermore, 
contended that while Pegida and the AfD were previously attacking each other, it 
could be ascertained that the AfD sought closer cooperation with Pegida calling for 
this ‘Herbstoffensive’ (fall offensive) in Erfurt.155 Also, in another article published 
nine months earlier, SDZ sees a link between the rise of Pegida and the AfD’s 
popularity: As the AfD obtained twelve per cent of the votes at the Landtag-elections 
in 2014, Pegida was founded later that year and directly gained support of some AfD 
figures.156 Furthermore, SDZ focused elaborately on news items about refugees’ 
backgrounds as in “Nach Pegida” (After Pegida) on 7 June 2015157, seeking, however, 																																																																																																																																																														
‘Niederlanden’, ‘internationalen Redner’, München, Bagida, ‘Bundesrepublik’, ‘Frankreich’, 
‘afrikanischen Land’, ‘Iran’. ‘Indien’, ‘ausländische Mitarbeiter’, ‘ausländische Wissenschaftler’, 
‘ausländerfeindlich’, ‘ausländische Kollegen’, ‘Heimatland’, ‘Eritrea’, ‘Marienplatz’, 
‘Asylummisbraucher’, ‘Erfurt’, ‘Flüchtlinge’ and ‘Asylbewerber’. 
152 The selection of political affiliation-related terms (some have been called twice or more) included 
‘AfD’, ‘Neonazis’,  ‘Linkspartei’, ‘Politiker(n)’, ‘AfD-basis’, politischen Diskurs’, ‘Parteien’, 
‘Berufspolitikern’, ‘Politikbetrieb’, ‘Mitgliederzahlen’, ‘politisch’, ‘Politik’, ‘Political correctness’, 
‘rechtspopulist’, ‘rechtsaußen’, ‘EU-Austritt’, ‘Ukip’,‘Rechtsradikalen’,‘Front National’, ‘Abschied 
vom Euro’, ‘Rechtsextremisten’, ‘Kommunalwahl 2014’, ‘Stadrat’, ‘Populismus’, ‘populistisch’, 
‘Establishment’, ‘SPD’, ‘(Ober)bürgemeister(in)’, ‘Landtagwahlen’, ‘Landtag’, ‘Fraktion’ 
‘Politikversagen’, ‘AfD-Obersten’, ‘Vorsitzende’, ‘AfD-chef’, ‘Pegida-Partei’ and 
‘Rechtextremismus’. 
153 The selection of turnout-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) included mainly 
numbers of demonstrations (e.g. 15.000 
Teilnehmern/Menschen/Anhänger/Demonstranten/Gegendemonstranten), but also ‘fremdfeindlichen 
Pegida-Spaziergängern’, ‘(Groß)Kundgebung’, ‘Zulauf’, ‘Abendspaziergang’, ‘Protestierer’, ‘Pegida-
demonstranten’, ‘Zulauf’, ‘Gegendemonstrationen’, ‘Pegadisten’ and ‘größere Zahl’. 
154 The selection of religion-related terms encompassed ‘Salafismus’, ‘Islamisierung’, ‘antisemitische 
Verschwörungstheoretiker’, ‘Kirche(n)’, islamfeindliche Bewegung’, ‘Abendland’, ‘Götz von 
Berlichingen’, ‘Ostermontag’, ‘Islam’ and ‘Koran’. 
155 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Cornelius Pollmer, Jens Schneider. Pegidas Partei. 9 October 2015 [last 
accessed 12 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-im-aufschwung-
pegidas-partei-1.2683289. 
156 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. Das Jahr der großen Wut. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 
1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-
montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049. 
157 Süddeutsche Zeitung , Haunhorst, C. Nach Pegida. 7 June 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. 
Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/fremdenfeindlichkeit-nach-pegida-1.2507124. 
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mostly to retrieve where the Pegida’s ‘Wut’ (fury) comes from (“Das Jahr der Großen 
Wut” – The year of huge outrage on 26 December 2014158), what the implications are 
(“Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikalen” – From Pegida emerge free radicals on 29 
January 2015159), and how to deal with Pegida (“Wo Hasstiraden verpuffen” – Where 
torrents of hatred fall flat on 23 April 2015160). According to SDZ, Pegida largely 
expressed their anger at the mainstream media and politicians concluding that the 
movement does not only encompassed neo-Nazis or members of extreme right 
groups, but also ‘ordinary’ people as schoolteachers, university professors and former 
school friends of Pegida counter protestors. As a result, the newspaper noted that the 
outrage of Pegida supporters partly emerged from the middle-class of society.161 
Finally, looking at religion-related terms, it is remarkable how little content there is 
on Pegida’s anti-Islam position. While Bild set Pegida aside in almost all of the 
twelve pieces as being ‘anti-Islam’, SDZ has primarily chosen to report on the 
movement’s anti-establishment/anti-elitist attitude, nearly always leaving out any 
reference to religion. SDZ rather spoke of Pegida in terms of spreading racist remarks 
and inciting hate towards mainly the media, politics and foreigners in general.162 
Another striking difference between SDZ and Bild is that the latter barely wrote about 
Pegida’s increasing turnouts in September and October 2015, whereas the former in 
the same period certainly did in terms of ‘Zulauf’ (increase) and ‘größere Zahl’ 
(bigger number). Nonetheless, both newspapers seem to agree that Pegida is a ‘right-
wing populist movement’ being potentially sensitive to radicalisation.163 Concerning 
the hypothesis, it is apparent that SDZ not only disapproved of Pegida, but also 
sought to clarify the movement’s rationale to demonstrate. In this sense, it is evident 																																																								
158 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. Das Jahr der großen Wut. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 
1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-
montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049. 
159 Süddeutsche Zeitung. Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 
[last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-
bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609. 
160 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Hutter, Dominik. Wo Hasstiraden verpuffen. 23 April 2015 [last accessed 1 
November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/kampf-gegen-rechts-wo-
hasstiraden-verpuffen-1.2447512. 
161 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. Das Jahr der großen Wut. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 
1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-
montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049. 
162 Süddeutsche Zeitung. Unermüdlich und besessen, 25 May 2015 [last accessed 15 January 2016. 
Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-unermuedlich-und-besessen-1.2492756. 
163 Süddeutsche Zeitung. Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 
[last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-
bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609. 
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to ascertain that SDZ has altered its tone of reporting from mere understanding in the 
first articles of the analysis to a steadily harsher tone on Pegida. Despite the gradual 
shift in position, SDZ repeatedly condemned Pegida’s demonstrations and its 
disgraceful symbolism (“Pegida und das Symbol der Hitler-Attentäter” – Pegida and 
the symbol of Hitler’s assassins on 3 August 2015). In order to properly evaluate the 
hypothesis, it is crucial to state that SDZ dismissed Pegida not merely because of anti-
Islam elements, but rather because the movement is generally seen as anti-
establishment including violent, aggressive and hateful remarks against foreigners in 
general.164 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to clarify the position of asylum and immigration in German 
history. It has put into perspective how German media tend to report on migrant-
related topics, which generally are felt to be highly sensitive. The events of the 
Second World War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall 
heavily affected Germany’s treatment of refugees and largely determined how 
German’s approach to refugees ought to be employed. Although the violent resistance 
among particularly neo-Nazi-related groups has not abated in past years, the most 
prominent German media expressively distanced themselves from any racist 
comments. In fact, most of these media opted for reporting on welcoming refugees. 
On the political level, a certain shift from the CDU’s viewpoint in taking in refugees 
has slowly become visible. While the conservatives’ position was characterised by 
conflicts with other parties, usually fiercely criticizing Germany’s asylum and 
integration policy, Merkel’s speech has promptly reversed the party’s traditional role 
of ardent asylum-critic into a surprising progressive leader. As we have seen, mass 
media play an influential role as an agenda-setter and news framer regarding 
contentious topics as asylum, integration and immigration. In this respect, Bild and 
SDZ heavily influence the public opinion in Germany. Both media determine what 
the reader reads and how this is framed. Concerning Pegida, both newspapers mostly 
reported negatively whereby generally rejecting the movement. As this might have 																																																								
164 Süddeutsche Zeitung. Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 
[last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-
bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609. 
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been expected from SDZ, the outcome of the analysis on Bild can be conceived as 
fairly surprising. In fact, it appeared that Bild used stronger terms to express its 
disapproval of Pegida. Whether this rejection was enforced through Bild’s usual 
‘sensational’ manner of reporting or not, it nonetheless is most noteworthy that 
specially Bild reports so decisively on Pegida’s position. Furthermore, despite the 
distinction of quality paper vs. tabloid has been clearly laid out, Bild and SDZ 
appeared to draw the same conclusion from Pegida. Two of Germany’s most 
prominent newspapers see Pegida as an objectionable movement that jeopardises 
Germany’s tolerance towards foreigners. Whereas Bild, as a tabloid, systematically 
labels Pegida as an anti-Islam movement, SDZ, as a quality newspaper, rather gives a 
more in-depth account of where the anti-migrant and hateful comments originate from 
and does therefore not only focus on Pegida’s anti-Islam position.  
 
Concluding chapter   
 
Roughly one year after the foundation, it ought to be concluded that Pegida has 
sparked a tremendous amount of controversy and discussion, and still is making the 
headlines today. Although the turmoil emanating from a social movement is nothing 
new in Germany, it should be stressed that Pegida is slightly different from its 
predecessors. Despite the academic debate on whether to call Pegida a right-wing 
populist, an extreme right-wing, or a deeply xenophobic movement is divided, the 
Dresden-based movement proves not to be a unique phenomenon, as Germany can 
look back on a turbulent history full of different social movements and dynamic 
activism. At the same time, Pegida nevertheless is an uncommon movement in 
Germany, due to its effective strategy of promoting social and political action. It is a 
movement that started out as a blurry initiative by a highly dubious figure, but soon 
appeared to be able to mobilise a mass of people in an unconventional manner 
through promoting the marches against the ‘Islamisation’ of Germany and Europe. 
Pegida, in fact, appeared to be capable of keeping appealing to people to attend the 
marches. This is strongly connected with the movement’s scale. Pegida possess the 
organisational brain of the SMO and the collective activism of the NSM, being 
capable of assembling people in a coordinated way. However, it must not be ignored 
that the Dresden-based movement often unpredictably benefited from several sudden 
events, as the Charlie Hebdo killings in January 2015, and also took great advantage 
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of the ongoing refugee crisis and the incapabilities of political leaders to find common 
solutions. Hence, it is highly noteworthy that Pegida emphatically meddles with 
political affairs. Following this line of reasoning, the positive effects of the political 
relationship with the AfD should not be neglected, as Pegida benefited considerably 
from the electoral results of the German party, the overall attention and often strong 
support it received from AfD politicians. As a result of this close-knit relationship, 
Pegida has grown into a nation-wide discussed phenomenon.  
 Equally remarkable to mention is the role of the use of Facebook. As 
indispensable part of the successful strategy, this social medium became the central 
place for Pegida to impart information and spread beliefs on politically sensitive 
topics as asylum, immigration and integration. In fact, as time elapsed, Pegida has 
become increasingly more focused on ‘Islamisation’ as the chief focal point and how 
to position the movement towards this theme. In doing so, the movement has not only 
been limiting itself to Germany. Accordingly, Europe and the EU play an 
indispensable role in how the Dresden-based movement actively pursue its goals, as 
outlined in both the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 programme. Due to the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks, Pegida became known even outside of Germany, where sister 
movements in European countries swiftly popped up, though not having the same 
success as in Dresden. Moreover, within Pegida’s position papers, Europe finds itself 
at the centre of discussion. It became crystal clear that Pegida radically changed 
stance on the EU. Whereas, the 2014 manifesto had been relatively positive on the 
European project, the 2015 programme fiercely rejected the EU. Due to the refugee 
crisis, the project of European integration has been under increasing attack from EU 
member states which appeared helplessly divided in resolving the matter. As a result, 
the EU’s status quo concerning the refugee crisis could be described as a core 
problem, ostensibly fostering the increasing support of Pegida in terms of higher 
turnouts, especially in September and October 2015. The message of abolishing the 
Schengen area and adopting an immediate German asylum ‘emergency’ law seemed 
to appeal to many German citizens, who might have lost faith in Germany’s current 
direction towards the refugee crisis.        
 At the same time, it should be noted that there has been considerable 
resistance against Pegida stemming from different layers of the German society. In 
this respect, it is interesting to see what the analyses of Bild’s and SDZ’s reporting 
have brought about. While it was expected that at least Bild, as a usual sceptic of 
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taking in refugees and hard-hearted critic of integration issues, would take Pegida’s 
side, the opposite was in fact true with Germany’s most-read tabloid being an ardent 
champion of the refugees’ cause. Despite Bachmann’s interview to Bild at the 
backdrop of scant media moments, Pegida supposedly forgot about Artl and Storz’s 
words to stay on good terms with Bild. On the other hand, there was the outcome of 
the SDZ’s analysis. While the hypothesis insisted on SDZ’s supposedly dismissive 
position on Pegida largely based on its hard-core anti-Islam rhetoric, the newspaper’s 
reporting mostly inclined to leave the topic of religion aside, preferring to single out 
and condemn the violent and hateful remarks towards foreigners in general. Despite 
the hypothesis was proved largely false or untrue, it has become evident that SDZ 
firmly rejected Pegida’s too extreme ideas. In an attempt to further address the 
research question, it can be argued that Bild and SDZ, as suitable representatives of 
the German media, have contributed greatly to the largely negative image of Pegida, 
being able to subjectively select and frame the news. As one might expect from a 
usual refugee-critic, Bild, for instance, could have chosen not to report on certain 
issues that would damage Pegida’s reputation, like the petition against the movement.  
All in all, it should be underlined that Pegida’s evolvement can be described 
best by taking note of Germany’s (and the EU’s) incapability (or unwillingness) of 
finding ways to manage the refugee flows into Europe. As for the German media, 
both Bild and SDZ, alongside many other media, have devoted considerable attention 
to Pegida. Regardless of the fact that the online articles examined have predominantly 
not been in favour of the Dresden-based movement, the extent to which Pegida is 
reported on has added much to the overall visibility and coloured representation of the 
movement, both in Germany and abroad. Nonetheless, it remains hard to state to what 
extent Bild and SDZ’s way of news coverage have actually affected Pegida’s 
emergence. Instead, it could be contended with more certainty that unexpected events 
such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the upsurge in refugee numbers after Merkel’s 
welcome statement have substantially contributed to the soaring attendance levels in 
the months thereafter, given that even ‘ordinary’ and ‘worried’ German citizens took 
to the streets taking part in Pegida marches to raise their voice. Perhaps these people 
were not all wholly supportive of the movement’s standpoints, but rather determined 
to participate as a sign of growing discontent with mainstream politics.  
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